http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/56835048/?tcid=tw_share
ST. LOUIS -- Let's start with the undisputed fact: The St. Louis
Cardinals are doing everything a Major League Baseball team is supposed
to do well.
The Cardinals won the World Series in 2011, came within a game of the
National League pennant in 2012 and currently sit three games out in
the NL Central in 2013, leading the NL wild card chase. If this sounds
familiar, it should. The Cardinals made the playoffs six times between
2000 and 2006, winning a pair of NL pennants and the 2006 World Series.
Those two eras have in common the ownership of Bill DeWitt, whose
group purchased the Cardinals in 1996 for $150 million. But the two
teams were built very differently.
"We were able to make trades for Jim Edmonds, and Mark McGwire, and
Scott Rolen, and Darryl Kile," said DeWitt, as we discussed the
evolution of the franchise during an hour-long interview in his Busch
Stadium office last Friday. "Really key players who had great seasons
with us, and really elevated the franchise over that period of time. But
we could see the landscape changing."
What those Cardinals teams sacrificed in the process of building a
winner through trades and free agency was any semblance of a farm system
as pipeline for talent to ultimately help the Cardinals win.
On the 2004 Cardinals, of the top 14 position players ranked by plate
appearances, one had been drafted and developed. Other than that one --
Albert Pujols -- every player on that list had either been acquired via
trades (six players), free agency (six players) or the Rule 5 draft. It
was no different on the pitching side. The Cardinals pitched 1,453 full
innings in 2004. Of those, just 65 came from players they drafted and
developed.
The industry noticed. Baseball America ranked the Cardinals between 28th and 30th in MLB in organizational talent each year from 2002-2005.
"We always pressed the draft, and were aggressive in the draft in
that era," DeWitt explained. "We signed [J.D.] Drew, and [Rick] Ankiel,
players like that, who other clubs either stayed away from, or drafted
and didn't sign. And we felt that was a way to build while we were
winning. But there wasn't a lot of depth to that, because when you sign
free agents, you give up draft choices, and when you make deals,
generally, you're trading younger players."
It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to see the expiration date
for this kind of team-building came roughly when the new collective
bargaining agreement took effect in 2011. No longer was it so easy to
pay extravagant draft bonuses, particularly for successful teams, thanks
to a sliding scale and harsh penalties now in place for teams that
exceeded their draft budget. And more teams with better financial
resources, thanks to expanded television revenue, were keeping their own
players, depressing both the trade market of would-be free agents and,
ultimately, the free agent pool as well.
That's obvious now, looking back from 2013. But the Cardinals changed
direction nearly a decade earlier, in the midst of extraordinary
on-field success. And they've continued, despite greater emphasis on the
future, to provide fans with a consistently excellent present.
"I would say in the 2002-2004 timeframe, when we really had good
clubs, through 2006 ... everything looked great, but I knew we really
didn't have the system to continue that tradition of winning," DeWitt
recalled. "So the goal there was to keep winning, but to build at the
same time. And we were fortunate enough to be able to do that."
This is the kind of Midwestern understatement that I heard from
everyone I talked to in the Cardinals' organization. So let's allow the
facts to do the bragging for them.
The 2013 Cardinals produced nine of their top 12 players in plate
appearances through their farm system. A 10th, David Freese, is an
honorary development product, having come over in a trade for Jim
Edmonds from the Padres without having advanced beyond A-ball.
The same is true of Cardinals pitching. Of their top 16 pitchers in
innings logged this season, 12 were either drafted or international free
agents, developed through the system.
The level of pitching depth the Cardinals currently enjoy within their
system was illustrated by what they went through last week, in a trying
series against the Dodgers. Shelby Miller, a first-round pick in 2009,
exited the game two pitches in after getting a baseball lined at his
elbow. The Cardinals inserted Michael Blazek, a 35th-round pick in 2007. Later in the game, Keith Butler, a 24th-round
pick in 2009, helped get the Cardinals through a forgettable 13-4 loss.
Needing a starter, the Cardinals called up Carlos Martinez, 21, an
international free agent with an astonishing fastball. But Martinez,
too, exited his start early, his hand cramping up in the fifth. Not to
worry: The Cardinals had another four pitchers on hand to finish the
game: Seth Maness, Sam Freeman, Blazek and Kevin Siegrist, all of whom
were drafted and developed by the team. To top it off, after the game,
manager Mike Matheny announced the Cardinals would be recalling Michael
Wacha to start on Saturday.
Wacha, a talented hurler in his own right, can't break into that
regular rotation, nor can Trevor Rosenthal (2009 draft pick), a minor
league starter with 13 strikeouts per nine out of the bullpen this
season, nor can Maness (2011 draft pick), who walked 10 batters total in
169 2/3 minor league innings in 2012 -- nor can many other pitchers
from the absurd bounty the Cardinals currently enjoy.
In 2013, Baseball America's organizational talent rankings ranked the Cardinals first.
So, to summarize: An overwhelming amount of pitching prospects,
enough to weather the enormous attrition rate in the profession. Hitting
talent good enough to populate most of the lineup and bench, and more
waiting in the wings, like Oscar Taveras, an outfielder ranked third in all of baseball among prospects by Baseball America and MLB.com. And all of this is around to supplement a roster that last won fewer than 86 games in 2007.
You're probably wondering now the same thing I asked everyone I could
find, top to bottom in this organization: How is this happening?
* * *
The answer to this question isn't a simple one. I didn't find someone
dressed as Fredbird in a tiny office underneath Busch Stadium, spitting
out players the Cardinals should acquire. Nor are the component parts
alone responsible, though the coordination and support from ownership,
the analytical component to player evaluation, the vital role played by
the scouting department (not to mention the seamless cooperation between
analytics and scouting), and a player development system with
principles dating back to the 1930s all play vital parts.
What seems to set the Cardinals apart isn't any one of these things, but the extent to which they all work harmoniously.
One thing DeWitt inherited when he purchased the Cardinals 17 years
ago, and which remained in place to help implement the renewed emphasis
on the farm system, is a tradition and strategy for developing players
the team drafts that goes back decades -- really, to the actual creation
of the farm system itself.
That was a Cardinals invention, brought about by a Cardinals
executive you might have heard of named Branch Rickey, in the 1930s. Put
it this way: It isn't possible to have a deeper tradition in player
development within today's system than the Cardinals do, because it's
their system. But Rickey left the Cardinals for the Dodgers in 1942. So
what does that have to do with the 2013 Cardinals, 71 years later? Quite
a bit, it turns out.
Rickey had a protégé named Bill DeWitt Sr., whose son, when he bought
the team, inherited a pair of employees first brought to the Cardinals
by Rickey himself: Red Schoendienst, still coaching with the Cardinals
at age 90, and George "The Professor" Kissell, who worked as a senior
instructor in the minor leagues until he died in 2008.
It was Kissell -- widely credited with mentoring an incalculable
number of players, including Joe Torre and Keith Hernandez, along with
managers like Sparky Anderson and Whitey Herzog -- who put together a
manual for player development, since updated but never forsaken, called
"The Cardinal Way".
"He had ideas about how to play the game," Schoendienst said of
Kissell last Wednesday outside the Cardinals' clubhouse. "And what he
did, he had young kids coming in, who'd never been away from home
before. He'd come in, and he'd be like a father to them. George knew how
to talk to them. And it was a lot of fundamentals, sitting there,
talking to them, what to do in rundowns, hitting the cutoff man. And
they still do that."
Your browser does not support iframes.
I'm afraid I never did get to see the manual, but David Freese, who's done slightly more for the Cardinals than I have, made me feel better. He hasn't seen it, either.
"No, I haven't," Freese said, laughing at the question as we chatted
after batting practice. "No, they have their own deal, and they do it
right." He added, more seriously, "What they do, whether it's the front
office, management, the coaching staff or players, you collectively get
people that know what they're doing, know what they're talking about,
know what they're teaching and know how to win."
Hitting coach John Mabry, who as a player was drafted and developed
by the Cardinals while George Kissell still worked as a senior minor
league coordinator, believes that the relationships Kissell worked to
cultivate with young players -- and to make standard for those charged
with turning young people into major leaguers -- were as critical as the
focus on the smallest detail of on-field play.
"The way that he taught engaged and involved players," Mabry told me.
"And that style of teaching is paramount. With George, you say it and
then laugh, but love," Mabry said, clearly aware that love was not a
word commonly thrown around next to big league batting cages. "George
had a love for the game, a love for the people who play the game, a love
for teaching the game, a love for understanding the game, and relaying
that and teaching that to people."
When I asked Mabry what stood out for him about Kissell's approach,
he said it was less a particular moment, and more that Kissell was so
was constant.
"Every day," Mabry said of Kissell's influence. "There were instances
every day. Personally, the way he rooted for me to succeed, more than I
rooted for myself sometimes. Understanding that he gave, no matter
what, his time, and that, to me, is more important than anything, ever,
that somebody would care for you that much that they would take their
time, and teach you what they knew."
Mabry is one of many hundreds who can attest to Kissell's dedication,
and the Cardinals have strived to integrate this style into their
managerial system at every level.
One man responsible for implementing The Cardinal Way system-wide is
Gary LaRocque, a senior advisor for player development who came over to
the Cardinals from the Mets in 2008. LaRocque stressed communication,
with a particular emphasis on building personal relationships between
players and staff, as paramount to developing talent.
"We spend a lot of time being extremely positive with our players,"
LaRocque told me in a phone interview on Monday. "We make it clear we
believe they can reach for that next level. I would like to think that
we work extremely hard in the system with our managers, making the
players understand that the coaching staff, they're in it with the
players. That's our lifeline for our major league club. So the emotional
aspect is very important."
As LaRocque described that bond, it comes about by "follow-up and
communication with a player, establishing a relationship ... It's not
hard when a player's doing well, because the player's emotions are in
check. But the minute you hit that speed bump, as a player, you need
somebody there behind you."
That communication is just as critical between the major league club, front office and minor league staff.
"Our philosophy, and the way we approach each year is, our plan is
put into place from the big leagues down," LaRocque said. "And we try to
put into place continuity of instruction, and communication …
"An example would be player movement. Part of what I do daily is talk
with all our managers, and know what they feel in terms of evaluating
our players. So let's say we move a player. One of the things here is
that nobody's caught by surprise. Whether it's a player from the lowest
level up, we've established a plan that a player could reach a certain
level if he's able to accomplish certain things and we're able to
accomplish certain things. … But injuries happen, needs come up.
Clearly, players are going to move.
"And to be able to coordinate that is to have everybody on the same
page with it. It doesn't mean they all agree, that's important to note.
And they all feel as if they can stand by their convictions, say what
they need to say about a player, a move, and then we, collectively, move
forward."
These are just fine words, if they aren't backed up. But the
Cardinals employ people for a long time, people who, if they didn't feel
part of the decision-making process, would have moved on. General
manager John Mozeliak has been employed by the Cardinals since 1995.
Assistant GM Michael Girsch has been with the Cardinals since 2006. Farm
director John Vuch is in his 35th year. Dan Kantrovitz has
been director of scouting since just 2012, but he's in his second stint
with the Cardinals, having worked for them from 2004-2008, not to
mention having grown up in St. Louis, going to games "when Busch Stadium
still had Astroturf," as he put it.
"I think we have a lot of really good people throughout our
organization," Kantrovitz told me in a phone interview on Monday. "I'm
equally amazed at the caliber of player our scouts can find as I am at
the adjustments that happen under the watch of our coaches and
instructors. And I think, putting it all together, it's a lot of people
pulling in the same direction."
* * *
As tempting as it is to simply assign the Cardinals' current
systematic success to a book or the development system alone, if that
was all it took, the Cardinals wouldn't have needed to revamp the way
they approached their player development, or promoted Mozeliak.
"There were great people who were here when we got here," DeWitt
said. "And so the Cardinals had that tradition of development that we
were able to build on. But you know, if you don't have the talent, all
the development in the world won't get you good players."
And so the pursuit of better players began in earnest, with a pair of significant new pillars to The Cardinal Way.
"We had a shift in our strategy, to try to build our system, and we
did it in a number of ways," DeWitt said. "We did it by accumulating
draft choices. We avoided free agents that would cost us draft choices.
And when we looked at re-signing our own players, the cost of re-signing
a player was not just what we paid him, but the fact that we would pick
up draft choices, too."
The organization's shift can be seen as last decade went on. In 2002,
the Cardinals had neither a first- nor second-round pick. By 2005,
thanks to this change in strategy, the Cardinals had two first-rounders,
two supplemental first-rounders and two second-rounders. That's the
difference between six of the first 78 picks in 2005, and not picking
until the 102nd slot back in 2002. Nor was 2005 an outlier: The
Cardinals selected five of the first 76 players in 2006, four of the
first 82 in 2007 and four of the first 91 in 2008.
But as DeWitt explained earlier, systems can't be rebuilt merely by
making big splashes at the top of drafts. And that's where the
organization's increasing reliance on trying to see something in players
that other teams didn't became critical.
"The other thing going on at that time was, there was a proliferation
of information available, not just at the professional level, but at
the college level," DeWitt said. "People got into statistical analysis,
so there was more information available. And we made a real conscious
effort to try to take advantage of that."
DeWitt described the timing of these two initiatives this way: "There
was a convergence there, from a timeframe standpoint. Of course, John
Mozeliak was through the whole process, and very much on the same page
on this front, but I did hire someone from the outside, Jeff Luhnow, who
came in and progressed to the point that we thought he should be the
scouting director. And he really did a terrific job implementing the
strategy, and vision we had."
Luhnow was hired by the Houston Astros to be their general manager,
along with fellow Cardinals front office member Sig Mejdal, after the
2011 season.
But first came the 2007 draft.
The Cardinals have had massively successful drafts over these past
few years, clearly, to have the number of drafted players they do on
hand, ready to contribute. But in 2007, the Cardinals took 13 players
who have gone on to play in the major leagues, from first-round pick
Pete Kozma, this season's starting shortstop, to 38th-round pick Adron Chambers, who was recalled earlier this month and singled in Tuesday night's game-winning run.
According to Chambers, it was the Cardinals who took his raw talent, and made him into a ballplayer.
"For me, I think it was strictly on instruction," Chambers said as he
sat in front of his new locker. "I already knew what I could do. But I
had great coaches -- I didn't know the game, I didn't understand the
game."
In other cases, the analytics department, and their ability to
recognize a potential steal later in the draft, has proven critical. Two
examples on the current team are Matt Carpenter, the team's second
baseman and most valuable player, per wins above replacement, and Allen
Craig, who has seamlessly replaced Albert Pujols at first base.
Carpenter was a 13th-round pick in 2009, Craig an eighth-round pick in 2006.
"Thinking back to being a fly on the wall at the draft when we
drafted Allen Craig, and being a part of that process, I think it was
just when we were getting started with analytics, integrating it into
amateur scouting," Kantrovitz said. "And that was a case where I
remember Sig, who did really good work on the analytics side, had
identified Allen as one of those guys who, relative to his peers, had
done really well. And then I remember our area scout at the time, it's
kind of funny, once Sig mentioned him, he said, 'Yeah, you're right! He
can turn around a fastball as well as anybody.' So it was sort of an
interesting situation, where you saw the marriage of what the stats were
saying to what the scouts were saying.
"And then, there's a lot of players who fit that profile. Allen just happens to be one where it worked out."
The Cardinals took Craig, assigned him to the State College Spikes of
the New York-Penn League, and quickly determined that he was playing
out of position. Incidentally, that's one reason he fell to the eighth
round, according to Mozeliak.
"I think he was mispositioned -- he was drafted as a shortstop,
playing third, and a lot of people weren't sure of where his bat was
going to take him," Mozeliak said of Craig. "I'd say by the time he got
to Palm Beach, which was high-A, he distinguished himself as a pretty
good hitter. And then, by the time he was at Double-A, I think everybody
realized he was a major league hitter. And so, it wasn't instantaneous,
and I'm just very glad we drafted him, because he's a special bat."
Every part of the Cardinals' system worked together on a player like
Craig. It wasn't just that the Cardinals had an analytics department
that found Craig; they also had a scouting department that reinforced
the numbers. Their player development team figured out within weeks how
to better deploy him in the field to maximize his ability to reach his
ceiling as an offensive player. Their coaching helped him do so,
providing continuity of instruction at each level. By Double-A, the
front office understood that he was going to help them at the major
league level with his hitting. And eventually, Allen Craig replaced
Albert Pujols, franchise icon, at a fraction of the cost. Ownership
stepped in, signing Craig to a five-year, $31 million extension this
past March, buying out his arbitration years and at least one free agent
season, while locking the team in with some cost certainty.
That kind of long-range financial planning can't happen without
smooth coordination between Mozeliak and DeWitt, each of whom looks at
the Cardinals not just today, but also through a three- to five-year
window. That includes players in the system, major leaguers whose
contracts are set to expire down the road and even potential
acquisitions from other teams.
"The first question is, is it a replaceable asset?" Mozeliak said of
the process of determing whether to invest in a long-term contract.
"And, if the answer is yes, then you have to define how. If the answer
is no, then that obviously puts a priority on finding a way to get it
done."
In the case of Yadier Molina, the market didn't appear to hold a comparable catcher of his defensive and offensive skills.
"Trying to extend him last year, it didn't feel like we had a catcher
coming that could fill the role he was providing for us," Mozeliak
said. "We also looked at him as the most elite catcher in the game. ...
So we made a full-court effort to get that done." And so they did: In
March 2012, the Cardinals extended him for five years, $75 million.
In the case of ace Adam Wainwright, the Cardinals believed having a
top-of-the-rotation pitcher of his caliber was by no means a certainty
among their young arms, and moreover, those young pitchers wouldn't have
Wainwright to mentor and serve as an example.
"We had arms coming, but we looked at Adam as a unique player to us.
If you think back to the last 10-12 years, we've always had that anchor
in the rotation, a legitimate number one, number two-type pitcher, who
was universally respected, was a leader, people trusted him, believed in
him. And that's what Adam is."
But finding "neutral ground on length and dollars," as Mozeliak
expressed it, is far easier when he and DeWitt are having so many
conversations ahead of time.
"Bill and I are always looking three-to-five years out anyway, so we
knew when Waino was coming up, and we were both prepared to know,
directionally, where this was going," Mozeliak said.
DeWitt echoed Mozeliak's characterization of their relationship.
"We do work closely together," DeWitt said. "Talk virtually every
day, meet quite often. Always trying to look ahead, and not just at what
we're doing tonight with the understanding that we want to compete
three years down the road, five years down the road, who do we have
coming. What do we need to do to make sure that, three to five years
down the road, we don't have a bunch of 38-year-old players finishing
their career, but not much coming behind them."
While the Cardinals are understandably proud of their current
standing, no one is ready to declare that it will stay this way forever.
The tactics that allowed the Cardinals to stockpile draft choices last
decade, for instance, have largely been cast aside by the rules in the
new collective bargaining agreement, though St. Louis earned a second
first-rounder in 2012 for losing Albert Pujols, and a second
first-rounder in 2013 for losing Kyle Lohse. Many players who, under the
old system, could have earned Type B compensation, will instead leave
with the Cardinals getting no draft picks at all.
But most of the factors that have allowed the Cardinals to win
consistently while putting together a farm system the envy of the
baseball world are still in place. There's George Kissell's legacy in
player development. There's a scouting system and the analytics
department, working together, the play of Matt Carpenter, Allen Craig
and many others serving as reasons to believe in one another.
As Kantrovitz put it, "Our scouts understand that, if anything, some
of the successes of Allen Craig and others reinforces to our scouts that
our system works. And at first, if guys might have been leery of
letting the data into the equation, I think having a little success with
some of those guys has helped, from my standpoint, sell it."
The same is true as it relates to the recent track record of the Cardinals' scouts.
"One of the things in scouting is, you have to trust, and you have to
listen to the opinions of your scouts," LaRocque said. "The phrase they
hear me say all the time is, 'I want to know everything you know, so
that I can make an informed decision.'"
And there's a partnership between a general manager in Mozeliak, who
was extended this past spring through 2016, and DeWitt, whose ability to
stay plugged in and fully informed has impressed his staff, and whose
continued ability to invest in the team is brought about by a consistent
revenue stream provided by a loyal fan base, even though the Cardinals
are, for now, locked into a local television deal that is far below that of even some NL Central rivals.
"The fans drive everything here," said DeWitt, who added that the
Cardinals are consistently in the top third in revenue, thanks to both a
consistent three million-plus in attendance, and the ancillary revenue
from the fact that so few of those tickets sold turn into no-shows. "We
don't have a big market, in the sense of our core market, a New York,
Chicago, L.A., those types of markets. So we know that if we have a good
product on the field, the fans are going to turn out. So that's a great
comfort, because we can project, if we're competitive, we're going to
draw the attendance enabling us to sustain what we have."
In the meantime, Mozeliak is turning his attention beyond the players
who will help the Cardinals this year and next, and is focusing on the
wave of young talent to follow.
"I'm starting to look at what those players look like at [Double-A]
Springfield and [High-A] Palm Beach, because, in essence, they're the
ones who are going to be knocking on the door next year, and the
following year. And so when you think about that, you are always trying
to time it, for when you're going to get that complement player up."
As for Kantrovitz, the work to build toward the 2014 draft, and even
the beginning of preparation for the 2015 draft, has begun in earnest,
with analytics serving to narrow the pool of players for scouts to go
out and then evaluate in person.
The Cardinals, though, aren't ready to declare victory.
"Look, let's be realistic," Kantrovitz said. "Once we graduate guys
to the big leagues, we're not going to always be perceived as one of the
top farm systems. We'll regress to the mean. And then hopefully, we'll
be able to use the same ingredients that helped us get to this point to
push us back up toward the top."
And DeWitt cautioned that just because the Cardinals have found
something that works today, there's no guarantee that's what will work
tomorrow.
"It's a very competitive business," DeWitt said. "And there's no
assurance that, if you've got a good team, and a good system now, that
you'll continue to do that. We're going to try, but there are others out
there that are doing the same thing, and maybe have a new way of
thinking about it that we haven't thought of, that allows them to beat
us at the game. So we take nothing for granted here."
In other words, I asked DeWitt, he was worried that the next George Kissell might be employed by another team?
"Right," DeWitt said, laughing.
Kantrovitz stressed the need to keep on innovating, a logical
strategy for the organization that once came up with the very organizing
principle for player development that exists today.
"We've tried to innovate in different ways. We'll need to keep
innovating in those ways, making those things better, as well as finding
new ways. Because other teams are really smart, too," he said,
laughing. "You know, there's a lot of really smart people out there. So I
don't think we can say that what we're currently doing is going to keep
working without tweaking it, improving it."
He's doing everything he can to make sure the Cardinals find the next
great idea, too, and it gets filed along side the work of Rickey, and
Kissell, and Hertzog, and Mozeliak in the next edition of The Cardinal
Way. But it can't hurt that in the 2013 MLB reality, these Cardinals, by
a fascinating combination of planning ahead and relying on their past,
seem to have given themselves quite a head start.